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Note

The Process
Due Prisoners
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
I. INTRODUCTION
Federal courts have been called upon in recent years to delimit
the scope of "prisoners' rights." This reflects an increased awareness of the need for due process safeguards to remedy unfair or dehumanizing conditions in state and federal prisons. Wolff v. McDonnel' is the most definitive decision to date considering the constitutionality of intra-prison rules and regulations. In that case,
the United States Supreme Court used most of the modern methods
of due process analysis in an attempt to find a "mutual accommodathe provisions
tion between institutional needs and objectives and
'2
of the Constitution that are of general application."
II. LOWER COURT DECISIONS

On his own behalf, and on behalf of other inmates similarly situ3
ated, R.O. McDonnell brought a civil action under section 19834
in federal district court challenging the constitutionality of a number of administrative practices at the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex. Included in these practices were restrictions limiting the number of inmates allowed to use the prison law library
at one time, and the number of hours a prisoner could confer with
an inmate legal assistant; inmates were also denied the personal
use of typewriters. McDonnell further alleged reprisals by prison
officials against those inmates who petitioned the courts, the censorship of inmate mail and the absence of procedural safeguards at
prison disciplinary hearings where serious sanctions might -be imposed.
The court held that (1) the denial of an individual inmate's use
of a typewriter did not infringe any constitutional rights because
1. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
2. Id. at 542.
3. McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616 (D. Neb. 1972).

4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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the prison permitted inmate legal assistants to type those legal
documents which the court required to be typewritten; (2) the
plaintiffs failed to prove a widespread practice of reprisals against
those inmates who petitioned the courts, although, if such a practice were proved, it would clearly be unconstitutional; (3) most of
the regulations involving the inmate legal assistance program were
reasonable but the seven-hour-per-week-per-inmate limit on independent research time was unreasonable; (4) because inmates' first
amendment rights had been recognized, 5 censorship of mail between
attorney and inmate was to be strictly limited to searches for contraband;6 (5) the highly informal hearing procedure used in taking
away good time7 was constitutionally satisfactory, although the
court found that it had not been followed in many instances.8
5. Rowlands v. Jones, 452 F.2d 1005 (8th Cir. 1971).
6.
Outgoing mail may not be inspected or opened; incoming mail
may be opened only if manipulation of the envelope, use of
fluoroscopes and metal detectors or other alternate means to
opening the envelope fail to disclose contraband and there is
a real possibility that contraband will be included in mail
from an attorney; in addition, if the envelope from the attorney is marked "Privileged" it cannot be opened except in the
presence of the inmate addressee.
342 F. Supp. at 625. The court further held that delivery of both incoming and outgoing mail must be completed within 48 hours of receipt. Id. The procedure which was declared unconstitutional provided that all outgoing and incoming mail was to be read and
inspected, although not stopped. Id. at 635.
7. Warden Wolff testified that the procedure used by the prison in
taking away good time is as follows:
(a) The chief correction supervisor reviews the "write-ups"
on the inmates by the officers of the Complex daily;
(b) the convict is called to a conference with the chief correction supervisor and the charging party;
(c)following the conference, a conduct report is sent to the
Adjustment Committee;
(d)there follows a hearing before the Adjustment Committee
and the report is read to the inmate and discussed;
(e) if the inmate denies the charge he may ask questions of
the party writing him up;
(f) the Adjustment Committee can conduct additional investigations if it desires;
(g) punishment is imposed.
342 F. Supp. at 625-26.
8. Id. at 627. The court relied on the Eighth Circuit's continued adherence
to the right/privilege dichotomy. Id. citing Morrissey v. Brewer, 443
F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971) and Douglas v. Sigler, 386 F.2d 684 (8th Cir.
1967). By so doing, the court merely required prison officials to follow Nebraska's statutory procedure.
NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-1,107 (Supp. 1975) permits the withholding of good time upon the order of the chief executive officer of the
Complex "after the offender has been consulted regarding the charges
of misconduct." NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-185(2) (Reissue 1974) requires
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Both parties appealed.9 McDonnell claimed the trial court erred
in finding the inmate legal assistance program constitutionally adequate and in holding due -process requirements inapplicable to disciplinary hearings. The Warden contended that existing procedures
at disciplinary hearings provided minimum due process and that
the court had erred in striking down regulations governing mail
censorship and inmate use of the prison library.
In response, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded several issues to
the district court for resolution. The appellate court affirmed the
district court's holding that regulations on inmate use of the prison
law library were unconstitutionally restrictive and remanded the
issue of whether the inmate legal assistance program as a whole
adequately met the needs of prisoners in habeas corpus and civil
rights actions under the test of Johnson v. Avery. 10 The court also
affirmed the district court's ruling limiting attorney-client mail censorship.
Regarding McDonnell's due process claim, the court held that
the Supreme Court's recent decisions in Morrissey v. Brewer" and
Gagnon v. Scarpefli'2 applied to prison disciplinary proceedings as
well. Accordingly, the Nebraska Penal Complex's procedures were
held to be constitutionally infirm. Although inmates had been
given a hearing, they had not been (1) not notified of charges early
enough to prepare a defense, (2) not given an opportunity to summon, confront or cross examine witnesses, (3) not allowed legal assistance in presenting a defense, and (4) not given a written statement by the disciplinary board setting out the evidence relied on

9.
10.

11.
12.

that, except in cases of flagrant or serious misconduct such as assault,
escape or attempt to escape, punishments shall consist only of deprivation of privileges.
For these reasons, good time could only be taken away for flagrant and serious misconduct, such as fighting and threatening an officer's life. The court ordered the restoration of good time which had
been taken away for such offenses as "messing up the 'count up,'
[sic], cussing a guard, or failing to have a conforming haircut. 342
F. Supp. at 628.
McDonnell v. Wolff, 483 F.2d 1059 (8th Cir. 1973).
393 U.S. 483 (1969). The Court held that a prison regulation which
barred inmates from furnishing assistance to other prisoners in preparing petitions for post-conviction relief was void, because the state had
not provided a reasonable alternative legal assistance program for uneducated or illiterate inmates.
408 U.S. 471 (1972). In this case, parolees' rights to due process safeguards at parole revocation hearings were recognized.
411 U.S. 778 (1973). The right to procedural due process was made
applicable to probation revocation hearings.

PRISONERS' RIGHTS
in imposing the punishment. The case was remanded to the district
court to determine which minimum procedural due process standards were necessary and whether they were being met.
The court farther held that restoration of good time was an improper remedy for inmates who were punished in proceedings
which did not meet constitutional standards. Following Preiser v.
Rodriguez,'3 the court stated that restoration of good time could
not be granted in a section 1983 civil rights action and was only
available in a habeas corpus action 14 after exhaustion of state remedies. The court. however, did authorize the district court to order
the expungement of any determinations of misconduct from prison
records if those determinations occurred in hearings where inmates
were denied due process.' 5
III. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
Defendant Wolff petitioned for certiorari and the United States
Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision
of the court of appeals.

Finding no reasonable distinction between civil rights suits and
habeas corpus actions, the Supreme Court held that legal assistance
must be provided for both, under the rule of Johnson v. Avery. 16
The issue of opening incoming attorney-inmate mail to inspect for
contraband had been narrowed, on appeal, when prison authorities
conceded they could not open and read all mail from attorneys to
inmates but claimed they could open and inspect all mail from attorneys if this were done in the prisoner's presence. The Court
upheld petitioner's claim and intimated that their concession
exceeded even that which might be constitutionally required.' 7
13. 411 U.S. 475 (1973).
14.
[W]hen a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is
a determination that he is entitled to immediate or more
speedy release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 500.
15.
Courts have recognized the damaging nature of such a record
entry.
"4** * [It] may follow him throughout the prison

system; if his punishment was without cause, he is
punished anew each time his record is used against
him.... Similarly, his disciplinary record may affect his eligibility for parole. * * *"
McDonnell v. Wolff, 483 F.2d at 1064 n.7. See note 99 infra.
16. See note 10 supra.
17. Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577 (1974).
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With respect to petitioner's primary claim of due process, the
Court held that the protections of the Constitution and the due
process clause extended to incarcerated offenders but that these
rights were subject to limitation because of the nature of the prison
regime. Where the potential sanctions for a prisoner's "flagrant
or serious misconduct"' 8 include solitary confinement 9 and loss of
"good time,' 20 the Court required certain minimum due process
safeguards in the disciplinary hearing. The Court refused to require the same procedures for in-prison disciplinary proceedings
which it had previously mandated for parole and probation revocation hearings in Morrissey and Gagnon. However, some of the minimum due process safeguards required by Morrissey for parole revocation hearings 2 ' were deemed necessary in prison disciplinary proceedings. They included: (1) a hearing before an impartial examining body; (2) written notice of charges to the defendant at least
24 hours in advance of the hearing; (3) a written statement by the
fact-finders as to the evidence relied on and reasons for the punishment imposed; (4) the right to call witnesses and to present docu18. "At the time this litigation was commenced, the statute gave examples
of 'flagrant or serious misconduct'-'assault, escape, attempt to escape.'
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-185 (Reissue 1974)." Id. at 545.
19. NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-185(2) (Reissue 1974).
20. "Good time" was statutorily defined and credited to inmates as follows:
The chief executive officer of a facility shall reduce for good
behavior the term of a committed offender as follows: Two
months on the first year, two months on the second year,
three months on the third year, four months for each succeeding year of his term and pro rata for any part thereof
which is less than a year. The total of all such reductions
shall be credited from the date of sentence, which shall include any term of confinement prior to sentence and commitment as provided pursuant to section 83-1,106 and shall be
deducted:
(a) From his minimum term, to determine the date of his
eligibility for release on parole; and
(b) From his maximum term, to determine the date when
his release under supervision becomes mandatory ...
NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1,107(1) (Supp. 1975).
21. Procedures required by Morrissey v. Brewer are as follows:
(a) written notice of the claimed violations of parole; (b) disclosure to the parolee of evidence against him; (c) opportunity to be heard in person and to present witnesses and documentary evidence; (d) the right to confront and cross-examine
adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically finds
good cause for not allowing confrontation); (e) a "neutral
and detached" hearing body such as a traditional parole
board, members of which need not be judicial officers or lawyers; and (f) a written statement by the factfinders as to the
evidence relied on and reasons for revoking parole.
408 U.S. at 489. See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).

PRISONERS' RIGHTS
mentary evidence when doing so will not jeopardize institutional
security or the goal of rehabilitation; and (5) the right of a defendant to seek the aid of a fellow inmate, staff member or inmate legal
assistant in cases where the defendant is illiterate or the issues very
complex.
The Court expressly denied inmates the right to confront or
cross-examine adverse witnesses. By way of justification, the Court
cited its obligation to make one rule for maximum as well as minimum security institutions, and pointed to the potential for hostility
and retaliation which would be aggravated by requiring adversary
procedures in proceedings
whose goals are rehabilitation and be22
havior modification.

Regarding appropriate relief, the Court affirmed the court of appeal's holding that Preiser foreclosed the restoration of good time
in civil rights actions, but reversed on the issue of retroactive expungement of records. The Court held that prison records containing determinations of misconduct not reached in accordance with
constitutional procedures need not be expunged, reasoning that expungement would have a significant impact on prison administration, would undermine the good faith reliance prison officials put
on prior law which did not require such procedures, and would be
"very troublesome for the parole system since performance in pri23
son is often a relevant criterion for parole."
IV. TRENDS IN DUE PROCESS
McDonnell can be seen as a product of the extension of fundamental due process beyond the courtroom into the procedures of
states and administrative agencies. 24 This is a "revolutionary expansion in the area of constitutional law known as procedural due
process.1 25 It has been accompanied by a disaffection with the
right/privilege distinction in constitutional analysis26 and has pro22. The procedures settled upon by the Court are very similar to those
in effect at disciplinary proceedings in federal prisons. The Federal
Bureau of Prisons' procedural rules do not allow complete disclosure of all evidence against a defendant regardless of danger to security, right of defendant to confront or cross-examine witnesses, or
right to counsel (but the assistance of a staff member is always available). The remaining safeguards required by the Court are in force.
Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 13-15, Wolff v. McDonnell,
418 U.S. 539 (1974).
23. 418 U.S. at 574.
24. Tobriner & Cohen, How Much Process is 'Due' Parolees and Prisoners,
25 HAsTmGs L. REv. 801 (1974).
25. Id. at 801.
26. See, e.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 443 F.2d 942 (8th Cir. 1971); McDonnell
v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp. 616 (D. Neb. 1972).
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moted inquiry into far-reaching governmental practices, including
procedures for the administration of justice. 27
The courts have held that the Constitution limits state and federal power to withhold arbitrarily certain statutory benefits such
as unemployment compensation, 28 welfare payments, 29 tax exemptions 3O and drivers' licenses. 31 The Court in McDonnell considered
good time as one of those statutorily prescribed benefits which
could not be withheld without orderly process.
[TJhe State having created the right to good time and itself recognized that its deprivation is a sanction authorized for major misconduct, the prisoner's interest has real substance and is sufficiently
embraced within Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" to entitle him
to those minimum procedures appropriate under the circumstances
and required by the Due Process Clause to insure that the statecreated right is not arbitrarily abrogated ....
Since prisoners in
Nebraska can only lose good time credits if they are guilty of serious misconduct, the determination of whether such behavior has
occurred becomes critical, and the minimum requirements of procedural32due process appropriate for the circumstances must be observed.
The Court did not go so far as to embrace the principle enunciated in Justice Frankfurter's concurring opinion in Joint AntiFascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath33 that an individual has the
right to be heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss
of any kind at the hands of the government. 34 The Court did, however, accept the proposition that "liberty," as well as property inter27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 644 (E.D. Va. 1971).
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971). See also Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
411 U.S. 778 (1973); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.

365 (1971); Snaidach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969);
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Sherbet v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963). See also cases cited by the Court for the proposition that a hearing procedure is required when an individual is
deprived of property interests: Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972) (dismissal from government job absent "cause" for termination of employment); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544 (1968) (revocation of license to practice law); Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385
(1914) (taking of private property).
32. 418 U.S. at 557.
33. 341 U.S. 123 (1950).

34.

This Court is not alone in recognizing that the right to be
heard before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any
kind, even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society.
Id. at 168. See 418 U.S. at 594 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

PRISONERS' RIGHTS
ests, are protected against arbitrary invasion by governmentclearly a next step in the development of due process doctrine.
In McDonnell, individual constitutional rights in general, and
the right to due process of law in particular, have been limited,
refined and accommodated to the needs and objectives of governmental institutions.3 5 As the Court wrote in Morrissey, "not all
situations calling for procedural safeguards call for the same kind
of procedure. ' 36 In deciding which procedural safeguards are required3 7 the Court's obligation in each situation is to identify and
strike a balance between the needs of the governmental functions
involved and the private interest affected by governmental action.
Before McDonnell, the Court had held that curtailment of constitutional rights was justified by institutional necessity and that
restrictions could be imposed on constitutional rights because of the
nature of an institutional regime. This position is illustrated in
two recent decisions. In Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers,3 8 federal employees and several political organizations challenged a statute39 which prevented federal
employees from actively participating in political campaigning and
management. The Court allowed Congressional abridgement of.
constitutional rights in this situation because the federal employees'
interest in political freedom of speech was outweighed by the threat
of partisanship to the impartiality of the executive branch and the
fear of "political justice. '40 Likewise, in Parker v. Levy, 4 1 the
Court held that curtailment of first amendment rights was justified
in the military environment. The conviction at a general courtmartial of an Army physician who disobeyed orders, encouraged
soldiers to refuse to obey their orders to go to Vietnam and openly
maligned Special Forces personnel was upheld. The Court reasoned
that the demands of military life allowed Congress greater flexibility and breadth in legislating the -abridgement of freedom of speech.
In McDonnell, the prison was considered to be a similar institutional regime, where the constitutional right to truth-seeking devices of due process could be curtailed because of the exigencies
of the institutional environment.
35. 418 U.S. at 556.
36. 408 U.S. at 481.
37. Id. citing Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886
(1961).
38. 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
39. Hatch Act, 5 U.S.C. § 7354(a) (2) (1970).
40. Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548,
565 (1973). See also Broderick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
41. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
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McDonnell also contains elements of an emerging theory of due
process which requires that a person entitled to a hearing must
be given only those due process safeguards which are crucial to
42
a fair hearing on the underlying substantive issue to be resolved.
This individualized analysis was used in Gagnon in determining
when counsel was to be provided at probation revocation proceedings. There, the Court focused on the nature of the inquiry and
the importance of the safeguard in providing a fair hearing on the
issue to be resolved. The right to counsel turned on "the need or
the likelihood in a particular case for a constructive contribution
by counsel. ' '43 Justice Powell wrote that counsel should be provided where the probationer makes a colorable claim that he has
not committed the alleged violation with which he is charged and
there are "reasons which justified or mitigated this violation and
make revocation inappropriate, and that the
reasons are complex
'44
or otherwise difficult to develop or present.
In McDonnell the Court accepted this case-by-case analysis by
finding that the right to counsel-substitutes for illiterate inmates
or those with complex cases was necessary for a. fair hearing on
the substantive issues. However, with respect to the right to crossexamine or confront witnesses, the Court rejected this analysis and
curtailed these rights. By so doing, the Court sacrificed these
safeguards to the exigencies of the prison environment, despite the fact that these exigencies may differ between maximum
and minimum security prisons and between individuals. 45
Gagnon's case-by-case approach, with its reference to the underlying substantive issue to be resolved, is desirable in determining
minimum due process requirements, because it serves to effectuate
the true purpose of a hearing-giving the defendant a meaningful
opportunity to be heard in mitigation as well as vindication. The
drawback to this approach is that it forces officials of prisons and
42. For a very enlightening discussion of this approach to minimum due
process requirements, see Tobriner & Cohen, supra note 24. According to the authors, the severity of the potential penalty imposed should
not be the sole or even most important criterion in resolving the adequacy of procedures in specific cases. Tobriner & Cohen, supra note
24, at 802. Such is the currently prevailing philosophy: a full
panopoly of procedural rights is given defendants in criminal trials
while lesser procedures are prescribed for defendants in parole and
probation revocation and prison disciplinary proceedings.
43. 411 U.S. at 787.
44. Id. at 808.
45. Others have struck the balance differently. See Wolff v. McDonnell,
418

U.S. 539 (1974) (Douglas & Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (Brennan,

J., concurring).

PRISONERS' RIGHTS
other institutions to make difficult decisions of constitutional dimension every day, subject to ultimate review by the judicial
branch, thereby increasing the burdens on both the prisons and the
courts.
McDonnell represents a most significant departure from the

"hands off" doctrine toward state prison administration which federal courts observed before the late 1960s. Absent flagrant or gross
constitutional violations, the federal courts pursued this policy of
restraint and noninterference with the management of and discipline in state and federal prisons.46 The administration of prisons
was considered an executive fuiction and the doctrine of separation
of powers was held to deprive federal courts of the power to control
or regulate the internal management and discipline of either state
or federal prisoners.47 To this end, courts reasoned that the eighth
amendment did not apply to states through the fourteenth amendment, that the sole power to adjudicate rights of prisoners was
through a writ of habeas corpus, 48 and that prisoners were required
to exhaust any and all state remedies before federal courts could
46.

The "hands-off' doctrine... is not a rule of law but a policy
of judicial abstention. Courts usually justify this non-inter-

ference on the basis of separation of powers-administration
of prisons viewed as an executive function; allocation of statefederal power-among the powers reserved to the states is the
power to proscribe an act as criminal and to set the punishment; cost-improved penal procedures are expensive and
courts cannot appropriate funds; or fear that judicial lack of
exrertise in penology will create disciplinary problems.
Hirschkop & Millenann, The Unconstitutionality of Prison Life, 55 VA.
L. REV. 795, 812, n.92 (1969). The sentiment was early expressed in
constitutional law that the federal government possesses no supervisory discretion or inherent power respecting internal affairs of the
states. Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
47. See, e.g., McCloskey v. Maryland, 337 F.2d 72 (4th Cir. 1964) (inmates
right to express anti-Semitic beliefs in correspondence held clearly
subject to administrative controls of prison officials); Roberts v.
Pegelow, 313 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1963) (inmate who forfeited 60 days
of good time and two weeks' privileges for eating "on the wrong mess"
was not entitled to injunctive relief); United States ex rel. Wagner
v. Ragen, 213 F.2d 294 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 846 (1954)
(prisoner in a state penitentiary held to have no right to sue warden
in federal court for alleged infringement of due process rights and
Civil Rights Act violations); Dayton v. Hunter, 176 F.2d 108 (10th Cir.
1949) (court declined to restrain warden of federal penitentiary from
refusing to mail letter from inmate to young lady intended to initiate
correspondence of a romantic nature); United States v. Jones, 108 F.
Supp. 266 (S.D. Fla. 1952) (Federal Constitution and fourteenth
amendment held not to secure to inmates the right not to be assaulted
or whipped by state's agents).
48. Williams v. Steele, 194 F.2d 32 (8th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S.
822 (1952).
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hear claims for relief. 49 Gradually, a great change came about,
which is reflected by McDonnell:
[T]hough his rights may be diminished by the needs and exi-

gencies of the institutional environment, a prisoner is not wholly
stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for a
crime. There is no iron curtain drawn between the constitution
and the prisons of this country.5
Lower federal courts had been showing an increased willingness
to accept jurisdiction in cases brought by prisoners alleging civil
rights violations. Religious freedoms, 51 access to the courts,52 freedom from racial discrimination 3 and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment54 were all explicitly granted to inmates of state
and federal prisons, while administrative abuses in prison discipline
were also exposed to judicial scrutiny. 55
Prior to McDonnell, lower courts had been called upon to decide
specifically which safeguards were due inmates at prison disciplinary hearings. The balance struck by the Supreme Court in McDonnell is more favorable toward granting procedural rights to prisoners than were some lower court decisions. For example, in Sostre
v. McGinnis,56 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a hearing is minimally fair and rational when the prisoner is merely confronted with the accusation, informed of the evidence against him
and afforded a reasonable opportunity to explain his actions. 57 On
the other hand, the Ninth Circuit in Clutchette v. Procunier5s found
that legitimate state interests did not outweigh an inmate's interest
49. Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519, 522 (2d Cir. 1967).

50. 418 U.S. at 555-56.
51. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964).
52. Younger v. Gilmore, 404 U.S. 15 (1971); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S.
483 (1969).
53. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
54. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).

55. See, e.g., Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968) (whipping
of inmates was held to be unconstitutional and state prisoners were
held to be protected by the due process and equal protection clauses
of the Constitution); Wright v. McMann, 387 F.2d 519 (2d Cir. 1967)

(prisoner stated a cognizable claim under § 1983 for violation of eighth

and fourteenth amendment rights in being forced to remain naked in
solitary confinement for 11 days in cell with windows open to winter
weather); Jordan v. Fitzharris, 257 F. Supp. 674 (N.D. Cal. 1966) (soli-

tary confinement in a strip cell without furniture, adequate heat and
ventilation, and denial of food and health articles constituted cruel and

unusual punishment).

56. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, sub nom Oswald v. Sostre,
405 U.S. 978 (1972).
57. Id. at 198-99.
58. 497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974).

PRISONERS' RIGHTS
in (1) written notice of the charges against him and details of his
alleged offense delivered promptly and sufficiently in advance of
the hearing to allow him to prepare a defense, with such notice
to include a written statement of procedures to be employed at the
disciplinary hearing and the inmate's rights under the hearing
rules; (2) the opportunity for the accused to show that he is not
guilty of the charges or that there are mitigating circumstances,
as well as the right to present witnesses and documentary evidence,
limited by the examiners' power to avoid repetition and irrelevancy;
(3) the right of the accused to confront and cross-examine adverse
witnesses, subject to modifications where legitimate fear of retributive violence exists; (4) an impartial hearing examiner who is not
involved personally with the facts or investigation of the infraction
and is not interested in the outcome; (5) a written decision based
solely on the evidence presented at the hearing; and (6) counsel
or counsel-substitutes who are provided before "serious" sanctions
may be imposed. 59
V. UNRESOLVED ISSUES
A. Self-Incrimination
Although McDonnell provided many long-awaited solutions to
pressing problems of prison administration, several issues remain
unanswered. Soon the Supreme Court will likely be called upon
to illuminate the interplay between the procedures mandated by
McDonnell and the protections from self-incrimination required in
such decisions as Miranda v. Arizona 0 and Mathis v. United
States.6 ' The possibility of self-incrimination arises when an in59. Id. at 818-22. See Dixon v. Henderson, 493 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.
1974); Meyers v. Alldredge, 492 F.2d 296 (3d Cir. 1974); Adams v.
Carlson, 488 F.2d 619 (7th Cir. 1973); Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d
1280 (1st Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d
701 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub nom Gutierrez v. Department of
Public Safety, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Gray v. Creamer, 465 F.2d 179
(3d Cir. 1972).
60. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Miranda held that the prosecutor may not use
any statements stemming from an accused's interrogation initiated by
law enforcement officers unless it has been demonstrated that procedural safeguards effective to ensure the fifth amendment privilege
against self-incrimination were used.
61. 391 U.S. 1 (1968). While in state prison, petitioner was questioned
by the IRS about his tax returns in a "routine investigation," and was
given no Miranda-type warnings. His admissions were subsequently
used in a criminal prosecution for filing false claims for refunds. The
Supreme Court held that tax investigations were not immune from
Miranda warning requirements and petitioner was entitled to be apprised of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel. The defini-
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mate is required to appear before a prison disciplinary committee
for violation of a prison rule and such violation may also be punishable in a criminal prosecution by the state. 62 The inmate faces the
imposition of serious disciplinary sanctions, such as solitary confinement and the forfeiture of good time, and in addition, any information or evidence uncovered in the disciplinary hearing, including
the inmate's own testimony regarding the alleged infraction, may
become the basis of a later criminal prosecution for the same offense. Clearly, therefore, the requirement of Miranda warningsthe right to remain silent and to have counsel at interrogationby its terms should extend to prison inmates charged with a crime.
63
In Clutchette v. Procunier,
the Ninth Circuit determined under
what circumstances inmates could be adequately protected at a later
criminal prosecution from self-incriminatory statements which
were made at a disciplinary hearing without the benefit of counsel
or Miranda warnings. The court held that
[ajdequate protection is provided either by postponing disciplinary
action until after criminal proceedings have been completed by the
courts or by providing the accused inmate with an attorney and
advising him of his right to silence pursuant to the requirements
of Miranda v. Arizona .... 64

Under Clutc6hette, failure to observe Miranda's requirements would
clearly render any statements obtained in custodial interrogation
inadmissible at the subsequent criminal trial. In addition, the court
held that failure to observe Miranda requirements would render
the disciplinary hearing itself constitutionally invalid. This determination was based on the Supreme Court's opinions in Lefkowitz
v. Turley6 5 and Gardnerv. Broderick.66 These decisions invalidated
impermissibly coercive governmental actions compelling self-incriminatory statements and granted relief in the form of returning
67
the parties to status quo ante.

62.

63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

tion of custodial interrogation was extended to include any interrogation of the incarcerated suspect, "regardless of whether the questioning
was intended to obtain evidence for criminal prosecution" and regardless of whether it was related to the offense for which the accused
was imprisoned.
The Supreme Court in McDonell did not need to address the issue
of possible self-incrimination in prison disciplinary hearings because
the district court did not find that any members of the plaintiff class
had ever been disciplined in an in-prison proceeding in advance of
a criminal prosecution.
497 F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 823.
414 U.S. 70 (1973).
392 U.S. 273 (1968).
497 F.2d at 822-23.
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Another decision supporting the proposition that Miranda safeguards are not adequate in the prison setting is Palmigiano v. Baxter.68 In that case, the First Circuit held that an accused inmate's
privilege against self-incrimination is not sufficiently safeguarded
by his being afforded the right to remain silent and to be advised
by counsel. On the contrary, in prison disciplinary hearings, the
inmate's exercise of his right to remain silent would seriously prejudice his defense at the hearing and impose a substantial burden
on the fact-finding process. Thus, the inmate is prejudiced at the
administrative proceeding to an extent not present in a normal
criminal trial where the defendant is protected by stringent procedural safeguards, such as a strong presumption of innocence for
the accused, a high burden of proof for the prosecutor, and the
right to call and cross-examine adverse witnesses.0 9 In its effort
to find a rational accommodation between the imperatives against
self-incrimination and the legitimate requirements of a prison disciplinary proceeding, the First Circuit Court held that the inmate
was entitled to "use" immunity for statements made in the prison
68. 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973).
69.
While [McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183 (1971)], holds
that a defendant faced with the difficult conundrum in a unitary trial of speaking out for a lenient sentence and risking
self-incrimination on the issue of guilt is not denied the protection of the Fifth Amendment, the choice facing prisoners
within a prison disciplinary hearing is far different. A criminal defendant faces many difficult choices during the course
of his trial: whenever he exercises his right to remain silent,
he quite naturally sacrifices one means of defense; on the
other hand, if he speaks out, he may open himself to otherwise
inadmissible matters which may be brought out on crossexamination and also to impeachment by proof of prior convictions. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 561,'87 S. Ct.
648, 17 L. Ed. 2d 606 (1967). The dilemma faced in McGautha
is but one variant on these traditional, strategic considerations
that run through criminal trials. It should be kept in mind,
however, that a defendant in a criminal trial may remain silent and yet still have the opportunity to mount a strong defense by calling and cross-examining witnesses. He is also
protected by the high burden of proof which the government
must sustain before he can be found guilty. Under these circumstances silence is not a fundamental sacrifice. It is often
a wise strategy.
The accused prisoner, however, has no such procedural
safeguards within the prison hearings. His opportunity to call
witnesses and cross-examine them is necessarily limited by
the possibility that the disciplinary board may rely upon informants. The burden of proof which must be sustained
against him is far lower than in a criminal trial, merely calling for "substantial evidence". If he keeps silent, his silence
is almost bound to seriously cripple his defense within the
disciplinary hearing. Silence is not a strategic alternative for
him.
Id. at 1288 n.21.
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disciplinary proceeding when there was the possibility of his being
penalized for the same criminal conduct at a subsequent criminal
trial.7 0
The most rational accommodation between the demands of both
Miranda and McDonnell was the one finally reached in Clutchette:
In essence then, the prison authorities have a choice: either they
can guarantee a right to silence without the silence adversely affecting the accused inmate and provide Miranda safeguards, thus
preventing the disciplinary hearing from being impermissibly coercive, in which case there is no right to use immunity if the prisoner
decides to speak at the hearing; or they can require that the inmate
speak in his own defense [Gardner v. Broderick 392 U.S. 273, 27879 (1968); Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973)],
in which case use immunity follows as a necessary consequence of
the compelled disclosures .... 71
This solution has found favor with academic commentators 72 for
several reasons. It allows the inmate to protect himself against
the risk of self-incrimination while preserving the integrity of the
fact-finding process and in addition, subsequent criminal prosecutions are sure to be forestalled when the inmate is found innocent
at the disciplinary hearing or is able to present mitigating facts
75
74
73
with the help of his attorney. California, New York, Florida,
78
7
7
Rhode Island, and the Federal Bureau of Prisons have recognized the potential risk of self-incrimination and already require
that either Miranda warnings or the right to use immunity and
an absolute right to counsel be given at disciplinary hearings when
78
the in-prison offense also constitutes a crime.
B.

Double Jeopardy

There also arises the possibility of double jeopardy when an inprison rule violation constitutes a crime punishable by state authorities. The inmate may be punished twice for the same act-once
in the disciplinary hearing and again in a criminal prosecution.7 9
70. Id. at 1289-90.
71. 497 F.2d at 824 n.23. See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441
(1972); Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
72. Turner & Daniel, Miranda in Prison: The Dilemma of Prison Discipline and IntramuralCrime, 21 BUFFALO L. REV. 759 (1972).
73. People v. Dorado, 62 Cal. 2d 338, 398 P.2d 361, 42 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1965).

74. N.Y. ATTY GEi. Op. 409/70, Feb. 11, 1971, reported in 8 CRim. L.
REP. 2486 (1971); Carter v. McGinnis, 351 F. Supp. 787 (W.D.N.Y.
1972).
75. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
76. 487 F.2d 1280 (1st Cir. 1973).

77. See Turner &Daniel, supra note 72, at 761 nl1.
78. This problem was noted in Turner & Daniel, supra note 72.
79. Id.
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If the in-prison punishment is the forfeiture of good time and is
imposed in addition to the sentence imposed at the criminal prosecution, "in-prison punishment goes beyond administrative control
and operates in substance like a new sentence to prison (because
it prolongs the prisoner's overall term of incarceration) ....
Although several courts of appeals have addressed the issue of
double jeopardy and held that no constitutional problem exists, 81
the issue seems far from settled. No court has addressed the proposition that due process is offended when a convicted inmate loses
good time and, therefore, may be forced to serve a sentence longer
than that imposed by statute or by the sentencing judge.
C. Remedies Available for Procedural Violations
There is uncertainty concerning the procedures available to an
inmate who believes that the determination of his guilt in a prison
disciplinary hearing was not based on substantial evidence, that the
sanctions imposed were not in keeping with the offense committed,
or that his rights as enumerated in McDonnell were violated.8 2 In
their separate opinions in McDonnell, Justices White and Douglas
both thought that disciplinary actions taken by the Adjustment
Committee at the Nebraska Penal Complex were not subject to administrative review.83 This would not appear to be strictly true,
because Nebraska's State Administrative Procedures Act,8 4 by its
terms extends the jurisdiction of the state courts to prisoners contesting their prison disciplinary convictions. However, even if this
appeal procedure were available, neither it nor appeal by an action
in federal district court for alleged constitutional violations would
be an entirely satisfactory method of accommodating the entirely
new category of individuals who were granted rights of constitutional dimension by McDonnell.
The federal courts should ostensibly provide a remedy since federal jurisdiction extends generally to prisoners complaining of constitutional infringements in disciplinary proceedings.8 5 However,
80. Turner &Daniel, supra note 72, at 766 n.23.
81. United States v. Cordova, 414 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1969); Keaveny v.
United States, 405 F.2d 821 (5th Cir. 1969); United States v. Shapiro,
383 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1967); Mullican v. United States, 252 F.2d 398
(5th Cir. 1958).
82. This would occur if he claims that he was not given written notice
of the charges against him in advance of the hearing, or that he is
illiterate and was not allowed access to a counsel-substitute for help
in preparation of his defense.
83. 418 U.S. at 565; 418 U.S. at 598 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
84. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 84-901 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970); see, e.g., McDonnell v. Wolff, 342 F. Supp.
616 (D. Neb. 1972).

740

NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 54, NO. 4 (1975)

the United States Supreme Court has held that the only federal
remedy available to an inmate challenging the length of his sentence and wishing to obtain relief in the form of restoration of
"good time" is a habeas corpus action, whose concomitant requirement is exhaustion of state remedies.8 6 Consequently, there should
exist a state remedy for prisoners whose "good time" has been taken
away in violation of the constitutional mandates of McDonnell.
An additional reason to have a state forum for these complaints
is because of real concern about the heavy workload of federal
7
8

courts.

Nebraska prisoners claiming constitutional and other procedural
violations at disciplinary hearings theoretically have an avenue for
redress under Nebraska's State Administrative Procedures Act,88
which was "intended to constitute an independent act establishing
minimum administrative procedure for all agencies".8 9 It entitles
any person aggrieved by an action of an administrative agency to
judicial review in state courts.9 0 The Nebraska Penal Complex fits
the definition of administrative agency, 9 1 and nowhere is it ex86. Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 778 (1973). The habeas corpus jurisdiction of federal courts will have to be invoked if the inmate desires
to have "good time" restored. See also 418 U.S. at 554. However, section 1983 could be used to obtain a declaratory judgment that the forfeiture of a prisoner's "good time" was unconstitutional If this were
done, then a writ of habeas corpus and exhaustion of state remedies
would be superfluous, as a practical matter, to effectuate restoration
of "good time."
87. The volume of appeals from disciplinary proceedings will differ among
jurisdictions. Warden Wolff testified that only a small number of
"write-ups" in the Nebraska prison are forwarded to the Adjustment
Committee and most complaints are resolved without a hearing. 342
F. Supp. at 626. However, 22,000 inmates were incarcerated at 19 correctional institutions in California in 1973 and 20,490 disciplinary hearings were held. Brief for Attorney General of California as Amicus
Curiae at Exhibit 2, Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974). The
federal government conducted 19,000 prison disciplinary hearings in
1973. 418 U.S. at 574.
88. NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 84-901 et seq. (Supp. 1974).
89. Id. § 84-916 (1943).

90. Id. § 84-917(1).
91.

Agency means each board, commission, department, officer,
division or other administrative office or unit of the state government authorized by law to make rules, except . . . the
courts, including the Nebraska Workmen's Compensation
Court, the Court of Industrial Relations and the Legislature
Id. § 84-901(1) (Supp. 1974). Only if the Adjustment Committee were considered to be a court could its decisions be immune from
review under this Act. If this were so held, however, NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 25-1901 (Supp. 1974) would come into play.
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pressly excluded from the Act's operation.92

The state district

court has the power to affirm, reverse or modify an agency's decision if it is (1) in violation of constitutional provisions, (2) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency, (3)
made upon unlawful procedure, (4) affected by other error of law,
(5) unsupported by competent, material and substantial evidence
in view of the entire record, or (6) arbitrary or capricious. 93 Although this method of judicial review of prison disciplinary hearings is arguably available, it may be unrealistic from the prisoners'
viewpoint, because the Act requires that review by the state district
court be without a jury and must be based on the record of the
agency hearing. 94 Ordinarily, in contested cases,9 5 the agency is
required to prepare an official record, including testimony and exhibits, upon the request of any party to the hearing, but the record
is transcribed only when the appealing party pays." Even if the
procedures required for an official record were made available at
the prison, indigent inmates might be barred from this appeals procedure for want of funds, since Nebraska's in forma pauperis
stat97
utes do not, by their terms, apply to administrative appeals.
Provision must be made for a review procedure for prison disciplinary determinations which would be available to all inmates who
are treated unfairly at hearings.9 8 Possible solutions include

92.

93.
94.
95.

96.
97.

98.

A judgment rendered, or final order made, by any tribunal,
board or officer exercising judicial functions, and inferior in
jurisdiction to the district court, may be reversed, vacated or
modified by the district court.
The actions of the State Parole Board are expressly excluded from review pursuant to the provisions of the State Administrative Procedures
Act, NEB. REv. STAT. § 83-199 (1943), but there exists no comparable
provision in the statutes dealing with the Department of Correctional
Services.
NE. REV. STAT. § 84-917 (6) (1943).
Id. § 84-917 (5). Any final judgment of the state district court is to
be reviewable de novo on the record by the Nebraska Supreme Court.
Id. § 84-918.
NEB. Ruv. STAT. § 84-901(3) (Supp. 1974).
Id. § 84-913 (1943).
NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-2305 (Supp. 1974) provides that upon an affidavit of poverty, expenses of printing the record on appeal in civil and
criminal cases are to be borne by the county. This new act has not
as yet been construed to encompass administrative appeals.
With L.B. 275, 84th Leg., 1st Sess. (1975) (never reported out of committee), the Legislature was attempting to enact the constitutional
requisites of Wolff v. McDonnell into statutory law. The bill dealt
with the issue of review of in-prison disciplinary determinations by
taking jurisdiction over cases brought by inmates aggrieved because
of actions of the disciplinary board out from under the operation of
the State Administrative Procedures Act and placing such jurisdiction
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amending the Administrative Procedures Act or enacting an independent set of procedures which would (1) permit review on the
written statement of findings of fact and determination of punishment which must be prepared by the Adjustment Committee; 99 (2)
create a wholly new procedure for handling these claims, such as
empowering a board of appeals (made up of persons from outside
the prison system) with jurisdiction to reverse or modify disciplinary determinations; or (3) permit a hearing de novo in state
district court where an inmate alleges constitutional violations,
claims that the disciplinary board exceeded its statutory authority,
or alleges that determinations of guilt were not based on substantial evidence.
Nowhere in the majority's opinion in Wolff v. McDonnell is it
indicated that the Court intended prison disciplinary determinations to be immune from judicial review. Even if it were held that
such immunity from review were constitutional under the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the Nebraska State
Constitution independently guarantees its citizens a sui generis
remedy in state courts for all injuries to person or reputation. 10 0
VI.

CONCLUSION

When the self-incrimination and double jeopardy problems inherent in the prison disciplinary hearing procedure are finally
solved by the Supreme Court, and when an adequate appeals procedure from in-prison determinations is formulated by the Nein the hands of a Grievance Committee. L.B. 275, section 5. The bill
was unclear as to whether the Grievance Committee was to have jurisdiction to reverse or modify the disciplinary board's determinations
in order to vindicate violations of the constitutional standards articulated in McDonnell. Without this power, the Grievance Committee
would be ineffective as a tool with which to check unfairness in prisoner treatment at the hands of the disciplinary board.
99. The importance to the inmate of the accuracy of the written statement
of findings of fact and reasons for punishment was recognized by the
Wolff court.
[The written statements] might furnish the basis of a decision
by the Director of Corrections to transfer an inmate to another
institution because he is considered "to be incorrigible by reason of frequent intentional breaches of discipline," NEB. Rsv.
STAT. § 83-185(4) (Supp. 1972) and are certainly likely to be
considered by state parole authorities in making parole decisions.
418 U.S. at 565. See note 15 supra.
100. "All courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury done him
in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have a remedy by due
course of law, and justice administered without denial or delay." NEB.
CoNsT. art. I, § 13.
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braska Legislature, only then will a proper accommodation between
institutional needs and constitutional rights of prisoners be effected.
The Supreme Court's recognition in Wolff v. McDonnell that inmates do not shed all of their constitutional rights upon entering
state prisons is merely the first step in the proper direction.
Rae Schupack '75

